In the Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was called upon to clarify the existence of its advisory jurisdiction as a full Tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ITLOS unanimously upheld its advisory jurisdiction, yet its reasoning is not convincing. ITLOS's interpretation of Article 21 of its Statute appears unpersuasive. The article discusses the interpretation of Article 21 ITLOS Statute pursuant to the rules on interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Arts. 31-33). First, the article addresses the article's textual reading, and criticizes the Tribunal's interpretation of the term 'matters'. Second, the article considers the interpretation of Article 21 according to the subsequent practice of the parties, argued by some states but not addressed by ITLOS. Third, the travaux pr´eparatoires of the UNCLOS are examined, with a view to understanding whether the drafters intended the Tribunal to have advisory jurisdiction. Fourth, the six authentic texts of UNCLOS are compared in order to highlight potential differences that may help understand the exact meaning of the provision. Fifth, the article discusses the relationship between advisory jurisdiction and state consent. The conclusion is that the basis for ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction under UNCLOS seems weak. Some general considerations conclude the article, together with a possible solution that takes stock of ITLOS's decision.
ITLOS finally held unanimously that it had jurisdiction; 8 however, the Tribunal's reasoning is not fully convincing.
The present article discusses the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS as a full tribunal, using the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion as a starting point (Section 2). The article subsequently turns to the interpretation of the UNCLOS provisions on jurisdiction (Section 3) and discusses the relationship between advisory jurisdiction and state consent (Section 4). The last section suggests some tentative (and normative) conclusions (Section 5). The SRFC member states are: Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone and The Gambia. 5
For the four questions asked by the SRFC, see Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, para. 2. 6
Argentina, Australia, China, France, Ireland, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom, Unites States of America. The Netherlands and Portugal did not take a clear position on jurisdiction, but argued only for a cautious approach in the exercise of such jurisdiction should the Tribunal uphold its advisory jurisdiction. 7
Chile, Cuba, Germany, Japan, Micronesia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland. Most international organizations supported the advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal (Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism, Forum Fisheries Agency, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, OSPESCA, SRFC), while the UN and the FAO did not address the question of jurisdiction, but simply discussed the multilateral instruments negotiated or adopted under their auspices and relating to IUU fishing. The EU did not address the jurisdictional question: it dealt with the substance of the questions in its statements, leaving individual EU member states to argue the jurisdictional point. 8
Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion, supra note 3, para. 69. Judge Cot alone expressed some reservations on the exercise of advisory jurisdiction in the specific instance. 
THE FISHERIES COMMISSION ADVISORY OPINION OF 2 APRIL 2015
In the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion's reasoning on jurisdiction, the Tribunal first recalled the arguments that states had put forward in favour or against its advisory jurisdiction. 10 States principally argued their views on the basis of three legal provisions: Article 138 of the ITLOS's Rules of Procedure (ITLOS Rules), Article 288 UNCLOS and Article 21 ITLOS Statute.
Under Article 138(1) ITLOS Rules, ' [t]he Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion'. The Tribunal explained that its advisory jurisdiction could not be based on Article 138 ITLOS Rules: [t] he argument that it is article 138 of the Rules which establishes the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal . . . is misconceived. Article 138 does not establish the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It only furnishes the prerequisites that need to be satisfied before the Tribunal can exercise its advisory jurisdiction.
11
Therefore, the Tribunal shifted its analysis to Article 288 UNCLOS 12 and Article 21 ITLOS Statute. Article 21 ITLOS Statute, entitled 'Jurisdiction', provides that '[t]he jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal'. Some states had contended that Article 21 ITLOS Statute should be read as subordinate to Article 288 UNCLOS, since the latter is the central jurisdictional provision in the main text of the Convention. However, the Tribunal stated that pursuant to Article 318 UNCLOS 'the Statute enjoys the same status as the Convention', 13 article 21 of the Statute should not be considered as subordinate to article 288 of the Convention. It stands on its own footing and should not be read as being subject to article 288 of the Convention'.
14 ITLOS based its advisory jurisdiction on Article 21 of the Statute, implicitly confirming that Article 288 UNCLOS does not provide for the Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction. The crux of the issue was the use in Article 21 ITLOS Statute of the words 'disputes', 'applications' and 'matters'. ITLOS held that '[t]he use of the word "disputes" . . . is an unambiguous reference to the contentious jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Similarly, the word "applications" refers to applications in contentious cases'. 15 However, in the crucial passage of the opinion ITLOS observed that:
[t]he words all "matters" . . . should not be interpreted as covering only "disputes", for, if that were to be the case, article 21 of the Statute would simply have used the word "disputes". Consequently, it must mean something more than only "disputes". That something more must include advisory opinions, if specifically provided for in "any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal". 16 The Tribunal held that its advisory jurisdiction is not based solely on Article 21 ITLOS Statute, but on the combination of Article 21 with 'any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal'. According to ITLOS, '[a]rticle 21 and the "other agreement" conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal are interconnected and constitute the substantive legal basis of the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal'.
17
ITLOS concluded that it 'has jurisdiction to entertain the Request submitted to it by the SRFC'. 18 However, ITLOS further held that 'the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the present case is limited to the exclusive economic zones of the SRFC Member States'. 19 This limitation of jurisdiction ratione loci stemmed from the consideration that ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction was based on Article 21 ITLOS Statute as well as on the treaty under which the advisory opinion had been sought, which is in force only between the SRFC member states. Article 159(10) provides in relevant part that:
[u]pon a written request addressed to the President and sponsored by at least one fourth of the members of the Authority for an advisory opinion on the conformity with this Convention of a proposal before the Assembly on any matter, the Assembly shall request the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to give an advisory opinion thereon and shall defer voting on that proposal pending receipt of the advisory opinion by the Chamber.
Both provisions constitute an express grant of advisory jurisdiction. However, that grant is limited to the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS, which excludes the full Tribunal. 24 In the relevant annex, the ITLOS Statute, Article 40(2) refers to advisory jurisdiction, yet only in respect of the Seabed Disputes Chamber; Article 21 does not expressly mention the full Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction.
As noted in the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion, the central jurisdictional clause in the Convention, Article 288 UNCLOS, does not afford a basis on which the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS could be upheld. An analysis based on the plain reading of the text of Article 288 confirms such a view. Paragraphs 1 and 2 only mention 'disputes', which is a reference to the contentious jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Paragraph 3 is solely concerned with the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber and of the other judicial organs referred to in Article 188 UNCLOS, namely a special chamber of the Tribunal (Art. 188(1)(a)), an ad hoc chamber of the Seabed Disputes Chamber (Art. 188(1)(b)) and commercial arbitration (Art. 188(2)(a)). Paragraph 4 25 Notably, paragraph 3 does not refer to 'disputes', as paragraphs 1 and 2, but to 'matters'. This change in language could be significant, insofar as the 'matters' referred to in Article 288(3) also comprise advisory opinions requested to the Seabed Disputes Chamber in accordance with the Convention. However, the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion does not state that the change in the language of Article 288 UNCLOS guided the Tribunal's interpretation of the term 'matters' in Article 21 ITLOS Statute, leading the Tribunal to decide that 'matters' in the latter provision also included advisory opinions. In any event, Article 288(3) mentions 'matters' in connection with the jurisdiction of specific organs, among which the full Tribunal is not included. Therefore, it would seem incorrect to transfer the meaning of 'matters' under Article 288(3) UNCLOS to 'matters' under Article 21 ITLOS Statute.
Article 21 ITLOS Statute is the bone of contention. The textual reading of the provision in accordance with Article 31(1) VCLT does not suggest that the Tribunal could base its advisory jurisdiction on it. 26 As noted in the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion, Article 21 ITLOS Statute mentions three distinct elements of the Tribunal's jurisdiction: 'disputes', 'applications' and 'matters'. 27 The first two elements refer to the contentious jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and it is not certain that the term 'matters', in its vagueness, includes advisory jurisdiction. The Tribunal's reasoning appears to lack cogency where, in paragraph 56 of the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion, ITLOS concluded that since 'matters' must mean something more than disputes, then that something more 'must include advisory opinions'. 28 Curiously, a commentary to the ITLOS Rules suggests that it is not the word 'matters' which could afford a basis for the full Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction, but rather the term 'application'. 29 Overall, the English text of Article 21 ITLOS Statute is quite inconclusive as to the existence of the full Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction. The term 'matters' is too vague to convey clearly that it also encompasses advisory jurisdiction, as noted by Judge Cot in his declaration. 30 Article 31(1) VCLT also refers to interpretation in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty, which is linked to the idea of teleological interpretation. 31 The question is whether a consideration of the object and purpose of the Convention could warrant the conclusion that ITLOS has advisory jurisdiction. The main problem of teleological interpretation is its 'overt "legislative" character', 32 since it could lead to conclusions not foreseen by the parties when concluding the treaty concerned. Article 31(1) VCLT displays a degree of internal tension: interpretation oscillates between the parties' original intent and the consideration of the treaty's object and purpose, which do not necessarily coincide. The object and purpose of the ITLOS Statute is further considered below (Section 3.4). Suffice it to say that a restrained and cautious approach appears preferable when dealing with the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, which emphasizes interpretation according to the parties' intent over teleological interpretation. As written by Sir Humphrey Waldock, 'the interpretation of a treaty must always have its source in, and be consistent with, the intention of the parties at the time of its conclusion'. 33 Such an approach would also strengthen the legitimacy of ITLOS's decisions, which would be firmly grounded on the jurisdiction the states parties to UNCLOS intended to confer on the Tribunal.
The subsequent practice of the parties: Article 31(3)(b) VCLT
Judge Kateka has written that 'article 21 of the ITLOS Statute provides the legal basis for the elaboration of article 138 of the Rules concerning the Tribunal's advisory role'. 34 One could argue that the word 'matters' in Article 21 ITLOS Statute should be interpreted in light of the subsequent practice of the states parties to the Convention, in particular the acquiescence of said parties to Article 138 ITLOS Rules. 35 Since the states parties to UNCLOS never objected to Article 138 ITLOS Rules between 1997 and 2014, the word 'matters' in Article 21 ITLOS Statute should be interpreted as encompassing the Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction. Before ITLOS, the United Kingdom argued that:
. . . reference has been made to "a general movement amongst States in favour of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions" and we have been told that article 138 has been mentioned on various occasions and that no firm objection has been made. . . . Even if there were such a "movement" or support, that could not establish a jurisdiction that did not otherwise exist. . . . Nor could such a "movement" amount to a subsequent agreement between all the parties to UNCLOS regarding the interpretation 37 While it is certain that Article 21 ITLOS Statute has been applied, and there has therefore been practice, in relation to the Tribunal's contentious jurisdiction, it could be said that the first application of the provision with regard to advisory jurisdiction was exactly with the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion. Second, subsequent practice is certainly not uniform, and does not show a common intention of the parties concerning the interpretation of UNCLOS.
38 According to the International Law Commission's (ILC) Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock, 'to amount to an "authentic interpretation", the practice must be such as to indicate that the interpretation has received the tacit assent of the parties generally'. 39 Similarly, Villiger suggested that:
[t]he active practice should be consistent rather than haphazard and it should have occurred with a certain frequency. However, the subsequent practice must establish the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. Thus, it will have been acquiesced in by the other parties; and no other party will have raised an objection.
40
In the present instance, it is difficult to admit that subsequent practice is frequent and that no state has objected to it. In the advisory proceedings numerous states opposed an interpretation of Article 21 ITLOS Statute which included the full Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction. Moreover, states may have been opposed to Article 138 ITLOS Rules since its inception, but knew they could challenge that provision once a request for an advisory opinion would have been filed. This modus operandi may have seemed more suitable than a challenge in the abstract. The second question is whether the subsequent practice of the parties could amount to a modification of the ITLOS Statute. One could argue that interpreting 36 ITLOS/PV.14/C21/3, at 20 (United Kingdom). 45 In the more recent case concerning Navigational and Related Rights, the ICJ held that 'subsequent practice of the parties, within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, can result in a departure from the original intent on the basis of a tacit agreement'. 46 The meaning of this passage is not entirely clear as to whether subsequent practice could warrant the modification of a previously concluded treaty, as underscored by the ILC. 47 The ILC Special Rapporteur on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties, Georg Nolte, commented that 'while raising the possibility that a treaty might be modified by the subsequent practice of the parties, the Court has so far not explicitly recognized that such an effect has actually been produced in a specific case'. 48 In light of the ICJ's restrained judicial practice, ITLOS would probably have refrained from admitting that acquiescence to Article 138 ITLOS Rules could be the basis for a modification of the ITLOS Statute so as to grant advisory jurisdiction to the full Tribunal. Surely, the Tribunal is not bound to follow the ICJ's practice. However, nothing in the circumstances of the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion would have justified a departure from the ICJ's restrained approach. In any event, modification appears unlikely given the conclusion reached above that the subsequent practice invoked was not uniform and frequent enough to warrant an extensive interpretation under Article 31(3)(b) VCLT. If such practice is insufficient for the extensive interpretation of Article 21 ITLOS Statute, it is a fortiori insufficient for its modification. The drafting history of the ITLOS Statute highlights a link between Articles 20(2) and 21, 55 which could clarify the meaning of 'any other agreement' in the latter provision, and thus be a clue as to the existence of the Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction. According to the Virginia Commentary, the words 'any other agreement' have the same meaning under Articles 20(2) and 21. 56 Article 20(2), concerning jurisdiction ratione personae, opens access to ITLOS to entities other than states parties, such as private entities parties to a contract with a state. Article 20(2) was increasingly broadened in scope, in accordance with the paramount goal of ensuring that 'the common heritage of mankind would be used for the benefit of all the peoples of the world'. 57 All qualifications of the term 'agreement' were progressively deleted, in order to encompass instruments other than treaties which could confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 58 The jurisdiction conferred in this respect is contentious in character: Article 20(2) ITLOS Statute uses the word 'case', generally used in relation to contentious proceedings; moreover, earlier drafts of that provision used the uncontroversial term 'dispute'. 59 The meaning of 'any other agreement' under Articles 20(2) and 21 ITLOS Statute appears thus linked to contentious jurisdiction. This entails that the agreement referred to in Article 21, which the Tribunal saw as potentially conferring advisory jurisdiction, would in fact be linked to contentious jurisdiction.
Moreover The analysis of UNCLOS's travaux pr´eparatoires does not warrant the conclusion that the parties intended to confer advisory jurisdiction on the Tribunal. While the drafts of Article 21 ITLOS Statute were always ambiguous, the meaning of 'any other agreement' seems unrelated to advisory opinions, and would point towards the lack of advisory jurisdiction. Based on Article 32 VCLT it seems difficult to affirm unquestionably that ITLOS possesses advisory jurisdiction. On the contrary, the meaning of 'any other agreement' could be a clue as to the lack of ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction. In any event, as noted by Judge Cot, UNCLOS's drafting history does not seem conclusive. The application of the 'standard rules of interpretation' to Article 21 ITLOS Statute yields different results depending on the language of the Statute. The application of Article 31 VCLT to most of the authentic texts of the Convention leaves much room for ambiguity, since the terms used are equivalent to the English 'matters', and thus do not clarify whether ITLOS has advisory jurisdiction. The Spanish text uses the vague 'cuestiones', and the Russian version resorts to the equally vague 'вопросы'. In Arabic the term used is which also refers to a vague 'question' or 'issue'. The analysis of the travaux pr´eparatoires in accordance with Article 32 VCLT is not wholly conclusive as to the existence of ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction either. However, the Chinese and French texts of Article 21 ITLOS Statute are clearer than in the other authentic languages. The Chinese text does not use the word 'matters', and only mentions ' ' ('applications'), which strongly suggests that Article 21 is limited to contentious jurisdiction. However, it is the French text of Article 21 that appears decisive. According to that provision:
[l]e Tribunal est comp´etent pour tous les diff´erends et toutes les demandes qui lui sont soumis conform´ement`a la Convention et toutes les fois que cela est express´ement pr´evu dans tout autre accord conf´erant comp´etence au Tribunal.
In French there is no equivalent to the word 'matters' of the English text. The key word in the French text is 'cela'. 'Cela' should be interpreted as referring to ITLOS being 'comp´etent . . . conform´ement`a la Convention'. This interpretation would exclude advisory jurisdiction, as Article 288 UNCLOS does not provide for the advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal. According to this interpretation, the sentence 'toutes les fois que cela est express´ement pr´evu dans tout autre accord conf´erant comp´etence au Tribunal' would mean that the Tribunal has jurisdiction when an agreement other than UNCLOS provides for the submission of a 'diff´erend' or a 'demande' in accordance with the Convention. Therefore, that phrase would not constitute a grant of advisory jurisdiction. As argued by the United Kingdom in the oral proceedings:
[i]f one reads the Statute as a whole and in the various languages, it is clear that "matters" refers back to "disputes and applications" and that article 21 deals not with advisory proceedings but with contentious cases. 66 The suggested interpretation of the French text could seem to create a hierarchical relationship between Article 21 ITLOS Statute and Article 288 UNCLOS, with the former being subordinate to the latter. 67 However, this is not the case, since the French text as interpreted above would only create a hierarchical relationship between the Convention and the agreement other than the Convention conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal in accordance with the Convention. In this sense, the agreement other than the Convention could confer jurisdiction on ITLOS, but only so long as that agreement conforms to the jurisdictional provisions of UNCLOS. The Tribunal rightly rejected a relationship of subordination between Article 21 ITLOS Statute and Article 288 UNCLOS, 68 apparently accepting that the two provisions are complementary, as argued by some states. 69 However, and in light of the French text of Article 21 ITLOS Statute, it would seem more correct to conclude that Article 288 UNCLOS and Article 21 ITLOS Statute cover the same ground in respect of jurisdiction ratione materiae, without at the same time being in a hierarchical relationship.
The suggested interpretation of the French text of Article 21 ITLOS Statute finds 'the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty', in accordance with Article 33(4) VCLT, 70 and is supported by the textual reading of UNCLOS's Chinese text. As argued, the French version of the ITLOS Statute shows that states did not intend to grant advisory jurisdiction to the full Tribunal, and that Article 21 ITLOS Statute is solely concerned with contentious jurisdiction. 71 While in four versions of Article 21 (English, Spanish, Russian and Arabic) the linguistic ambiguities could lead one to conclude both in favour and against the existence of advisory jurisdiction, the French and Chinese versions only allow one to conclude that there is no advisory jurisdiction. Those two versions are the ones which best reconcile all authentic texts of the Convention, 72 and should thus be preferred. The suggested interpretation of the French and Chinese texts is also in accordance with the object and purpose of the ITLOS Statute. The object and purpose of the Statute of the Tribunal could be said to be same, mutatis mutandis, as the object and purpose of the Statute of the ICJ, as spelled out in LaGrand: '[t]he object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to fulfil the functions provided for therein, and, in particular, the basic function of judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions'. 73 ITLOS's basic function is the 'judicial settlement of international disputes by binding decisions', which excludes advisory opinions. Furthermore, the functions of ITLOS under the Statute only provide expressly for advisory opinions to be given by the Seabed Disputes Chamber, 74 which is thus the only judicial organ having advisory jurisdiction under the ITLOS Statute. This conclusion is the more restrictive vis-`a-vis upholding the full Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is in accordance with the interpretative canon laid out by the PCIJ under which 'if the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in choosing between several admissible interpretations, the one which involves the minimum of obligations for the Parties should be adopted'. 75 When dealing with jurisdiction of inter-state tribunals, a cautious approach ought in principle to be favoured, and balanced with the application of the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of jurisdictional clauses. 76 Caution fosters the states' goodwill: due to the consensual basis of the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, an audacious stance on jurisdiction could result in the loss of cases. Writing about the ICJ, Lauterpacht stated that notwithstanding the fact that the Court has a duty to render advisory opinions, there are certain limits to such a duty. Lauterpacht explained that:
[t]hese limits are of a legal character; they are determined by the fact that the Court is the judicial organ of the United Nations and that in acting in an advisory capacity it must act in accordance with its judicial character, the requirements of its Statute, and the principles of international law. 77 The lack of a legal provision empowering ITLOS to render advisory opinions appears to be one of the legal limits to advisory jurisdiction mentioned by Lauterpacht.
THE TRIBUNAL'S ADVISORY JURISDICTION AND STATE CONSENT
The assertion of jurisdiction by ITLOS in the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion raises the question of the relationship between advisory jurisdiction and state consent. For a state to be a party to contentious proceedings before an international tribunal there must exist an expression of that state's consent. 78 However, the question is different in respect of advisory jurisdiction. Advisory opinions are not the outcome of contentious proceedings and have no binding force. 79 This analysis is a sound description of the Eastern Carelia doctrine and of its evolution from a question of jurisdiction to one of admissibility. 84 Nevertheless, the arguments based on the lack of binding character of advisory opinions and on the Eastern Carelia principle seem to miss the point in respect of advisory jurisdiction of the full Tribunal under UNCLOS. First, concerning the Eastern Carelia argument, a distinction should be drawn between two different kinds of consent. Consent in relation to ITLOS's advisory jurisdiction is not consent to be a party to advisory proceedings; a state needs not give its consent in order for an international tribunal to render an advisory opinion, so long as the tribunal concerned is empowered to do so under its constitutive instrument. The notion of consent relevant in the present discussion is a more fundamental one, relating to consent in treaty-making. UNCLOS, ITLOS's constitutive treaty, does not contain any provision clearly endowing the full Tribunal with advisory jurisdiction: in this sense states have not consented to the Tribunal exercising advisory jurisdiction. Second, the fact that advisory opinions do not have binding force is irrelevant for the purposes of establishing whether the Tribunal has advisory jurisdiction. Despite not being binding, advisory opinions are authoritative statements of what the law is, and could have important legal effects 80 ITLOS/PV.14/C21/2, at 5 (Germany). See also Ibid., at 25 (Chile); ITLOS/PV.14/C21/3, at 5 (Micronesia). 81 This argument is clear in Germany's oral statement, see ITLOS/PV.14/C21/2, at 5 (Germany). 86 Similarly, the Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion had a remarkable influence on the development of the law of reservations, which culminated in the codification in the VCLT of the criteria laid down by the court in the advisory opinion. 87 In his dissenting opinion in Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), Judge Sir Robert Jennings wrote that 'it would be unrealistic even in consideration of strict legal principle, to suppose that the effects of a judgment are thus wholly confined by Article 59 [of the ICJ's Statute]'. 88 The same could be said for advisory opinions: although not binding on states, they are nevertheless bound to have legal effects on state behaviour. 89 One could also frame the question of consent to advisory jurisdiction as a matter of conferral of powers from states on international organizations. International organizations are governed by the principle of speciality, as expressed by the PCIJ in European Commission of the Danube. 90 ITLOS, which has international legal personality, 91 was endowed with certain powers by the states parties to UNCLOS. Such powers, as argued above, do not include the power to render advisory opinions. In this perspective, if the Tribunal gave an advisory opinion under the current legal framework, it would exceed the powers conferred on it by the states parties to UN-CLOS; it would act ultra vires. One could counter-argue that an institution having international legal personality also has implied powers, as suggested in the oral proceedings before ITLOS. 92 However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. In Reparations for Injuries, the ICJ held that '[u]nder international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties'. 93 The question is whether the power to give advisory opinions is 'essential to the performance' of the Tribunal's duty as a judicial organ. While it may be desirable that ITLOS possesses advisory jurisdiction, it cannot be said that such jurisdiction is 'essential'. Reparations for Injuries sets a high bar for the recognition of implied powers to a non-state entity having international legal personality, namely that the presence of those implied powers must be 'essential' for the performance of the entity's mission. 94 In the case of ITLOS, the result of the exercise of advisory jurisdiction could be achieved also by exercising contentious jurisdiction. The legal questions posed by the SRFC to the Tribunal could have been answered in contentious proceedings brought by a SRFC member state against the flag state of a vessel seized when committing IUU fishing in that SRFC member state's EEZ. As argued by Australia before ITLOS:
. . . it is a sine qua non of adjudication by international courts and tribunals that it is based upon the consent of States. This applies as much to advisory opinion competence as it does to contentious cases. Jurisdiction to adjudicate is always the subject of express conferral. It is not to be implied. 95 Paraphrasing Lord Bingham of Cornhill, 'it is an elementary principle that anyone purporting to exercise a [conventional] power must not act beyond or outside the limits of the power conferred'. 96 In addition to doubting that jurisdiction could be considered an implied power based on ITLOS's international legal personality, one could also doubt the soundness of viewing advisory jurisdiction as an inherent power based on ITLOS's character as an international judicial organ. 97 Seemingly following such a line of argument, Judge Cot observed that 'nothing in the Convention prohibits the Tribunal from exercising advisory jurisdiction'. 98 Between the lines, Judge Cot appeared to suggest that the judicial function of the Tribunal, coupled with the lack of an express prohibition in UNCLOS, would justify the assertion of advisory jurisdiction. However, the simple fact that nothing in the Convention prevents the full Tribunal from rendering advisory opinions cannot be a basis for such advisory jurisdiction. Judge Cot's argument, which assumes a normative vacuum in the Convention, suffers from the same weakness as the reasoning of the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion: the lack of a legal provision endowing the full Tribunal with advisory jurisdiction. The states left a legal vacuum in respect of the Tribunal's power to render advisory opinions. The mere absence of any rule prohibiting the Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction does not mean that the states intended the Tribunal to have advisory jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it has been authoritatively argued that advisory jurisdiction is not an inherent power based on a tribunal's character as a judicial organ: advisory jurisdiction must be clearly and explicitly conferred by the tribunal's constitutive instrument. 99 Advisory jurisdiction was first conferred on the PCIJ, and it was an innovation in international dispute settlement. 100 At the San Francisco conference, which marked the transition from the PCIJ to the present Court, states debated the propriety of endowing the newly-instituted ICJ with advisory jurisdiction. Some contended that the advisory function was 'incompatible with the true function of a court of law, which was to hear and decide disputes'. 101 Advisory jurisdiction was not codified in the Statute of the PCIJ because it was inherent in the international judicial function. Furthermore, despite the repeated use of advisory opinions during the PCIJ's years, some states argued that advisory jurisdiction would not be fully compatible with the ICJ's judicial function. Similarly to the ICJ, ITLOS could not possess advisory jurisdiction unless it were granted to it by UNCLOS. The drafting history of the Convention does not show that states intended to confer advisory jurisdiction on ITLOS as a full tribunal (see above 3.3). On the contrary, it emerges that advisory jurisdiction was only intended to be conferred on the Seabed Disputes Chamber. 102 Generally, international courts and tribunals having jurisdiction to render advisory opinions are expressly empowered to do so under their constitutive instruments. The prime example is that of the ICJ. Pursuant to Article 96 UN Charter:
practice of other international tribunals in the exercise of advisory jurisdiction supports this conclusion.
CONCLUSION: A NORMATIVE SOLUTION
One could say that ITLOS 'employed textual and teleological reasoning to reach a predetermined result'.
110 From a normative standpoint, it may be desirable that ITLOS be endowed with advisory jurisdiction. The delivery of the Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion enabled the Tribunal to address certain key issues relating to IUU fishing. As the UN Secretary-General has stated, '[i]llegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is a global problem which occurs in virtually all capture fisheries, including beyond areas of national jurisdiction'. However, the simplified procedure is not without obstacles: a single state could in fact stop the amendment process simply by raising an objection.
Speaking at the UN General Assembly as ITLOS President, Vladimir Golitsyn declared that:
[t]he Tribunal's jurisdiction is certainly not limited to contentious cases. As the Assembly is aware, the Tribunal can also exercise advisory functions, pursuant to article 21 of its Statute. Under this provision, the Tribunal's jurisdiction comprises all matters Under the current legal framework, this statement is not persuasive. However, it could become so if the states parties to the Convention decided to take stock of ITLOS's decision to uphold its advisory jurisdiction, and made a formal amendment to the ITLOS Statute to expressly confer advisory jurisdiction on the Tribunal under appropriate and clearly specified conditions. In light of the significant challenges states face relating to the law of the sea, it is desirable that ITLOS be clearly and expressly endowed with advisory jurisdiction. The Tribunal has already upheld its advisory jurisdiction, but has done so in an unconvincing manner. It is now up to the states parties to the Convention to put things right.
